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Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy 
First published October 2007 
Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy (1888-1973) was a sociologist and social philosopher 
who, along with his close friend Franz Rosenzweig, and Ferdinand Ebner and 
Martin Buber was a major exponent of speech thinking or dialogicism. The 
central insight of speech thinking is that speech or language  is not merely, or 
even primarily, a descriptive act, but a responsive and creative act which is the 
basis of our social existence.1 The greater part of Rosenstock-Huessy’s work was 
devoted to demonstrating how speech/ language, through its unpredictable 
fecundity, expands our powers and, through its inescapably historical forming 
character also binds them. According to Rosenstock-Huessy, speech makes us 
collective masters of time and gives us the ability to overcome historical death by 
founding new more expansive and fulfilling spaces of social-life. 
Rosenstock-Huessy also belonged to that post-Nietzschean revival of religious 
thought which  included Franz Rosenzweig, Karl Barth, Leo Weismantel, Hans 
and Rudolf Ehrenberg, Viktor von Weizsäcker, Martin Buber, Leo Schestow, 
Hugo Bergmann, Florens Christian Range, Nikolaj Berdjejew, Margaret Susman, 
Werner Picht  (all of whom were involved in the Patmos publishing  house and its 
offshoot Die Kreatur)  and Paul Tillich. Common to this group was the belief that 
religious speech, which they saw as distinctly not metaphysical, disclosed layers 
of experience and creativity (personal and socio-historical) which remain 
inaccessible to the metaphysics of naturalism.  
 
1. Overview 
2. Life and Work 
3. Speech, Time, History 
4. Christianity of Non-transcendence 
 
1. Overview 
As with Franz Rosenzweig who goes to great length in The Star of Redemption 
and Understanding the Sick and the Healthy  to demonstrate that God, man and 
world underpin three fundamentally different and irreducible foundations of 
explanation which have shaped our history, Rosenstock-Huessy was convinced 
                                                 
1 Sprache in German refers to both speech and language. In general Rosenstock-Huessy when 
writing in English talked of speech when describing his central preoccupation – but not always 
and he also referred to what he was doing as grammatical thinking.  
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that humanism’s attempt to free itself from all gods (making itself and/ or nature 
the ground of reality) was based upon a failure to grasp more ancient insights into 
the nature of the real and the relationship between reality, language and history. 
To this important extent, and, again like Rosenzweig, he argued that language was 
more fundamental than either philosophy or religion and philosophy’s attempt to 
free itself from and reduce religion to a deficient kind of philosophy was based 
upon its failure to take language and hence reality sufficiently seriously. As he 
would say in ‘First Cycle of Letters to Cynthia (Harris)’: ‘Not religion but 
language forces man to distinguish between this world and the real world, the 
world as we know it and the genuine, or better known world. The crux of 
theology is a crux of language, and all our  rationalists are not protesting against 
religion but against speech’ (1943, 162). 
 
But unlike Karl Barth or Paul Tillich, for example, who saw themselves as fusing 
philosophy and theology, Rosenstock-Huessy  refused to see himself primarily as 
a philosopher or theologian - though when the term philosopher was qualified by 
the preceding ‘social,’ he was more willing to accept that designation.2 His 
criticisms of theology and philosophy were numerous, varied in content and 
highly nuanced – and hence unable to receive full treatment here. Generally, 
though, he thought both were, what he called, ‘second order activities,’ or 
products of the reflective mind at ‘play.’ That is, philosophical and theological 
speech trailed behind and were dependent upon the more urgent and creative acts 
of ‘founding,’ i.e. those acts which emerge out of life’s exigencies, which are 
epoch making ‘events’ and which are at the source of human institutions and new 
forms of life, and which cannot be separated from the vocabulary, or, more 
specifically, the shared names and foci of orientation which connect us across 
space and over time.3 In the most philosophical of all his works, the first volume 
of his Soziologie, when contrasting the respective limits of theology with 
philosophy, he says that theology is guilty of reducing us to sinners and angels 
and thus not adequately accounting for our being flesh and blood, while 
philosophers tend to reduce us to objects and things in the dead space of the 
universe and ‘to mirror the objective world in their subjective world.’ (1956, 286) 
‘Religion,’ he says in that same section, ‘is unjust against nature and the human 
spirit (Geist)’; while philosophy is blind to ‘the time-endowing forces’ (‘die 
zeitstiftenden Gewalten’).4 
                                                 
2 He was to engage critically with Barth throughout his life but see especially the letter to Barth 
(1920b, 9-16) and  his autobiographical reflections (1968, 81-84). For Brunner (1942). 
3 Die Soziologie Vol. 1: Die Übermacht der Räume provides a lengthy analysis of the distinction 
between seriousness and play; it concedes that what is created as play may enter again in the 
stream of life in seriousness, which of course happened with the death of Socrates.  
4 Generally, though, Rosenstock-Huessy insists upon distinguishing between theology and 
religion, the former being a Medieval creation to deal with a Medieval problem, which involved 
recasting religious speech into a form more in tune with the philosophical or ,what he just as 
frequently called, the Greek mind. See 1970a 37-43, and 1991a, 22-82. 
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Against philosophers and theologians, he saw his task as restoring our attunement 
to the potencies embedded in our speech and institutions so that we could draw 
upon the power of past times in order to strengthen our openness to the promise of 
the future in the present. To this end, while his corpus cuts across numerous 
disciplines, his major systematic work, one rewritten throughout the course of his 
life, was his two volume Soziologie (still un-translated, and for some years it has 
been in process of being re-released in Germany as an annotated edition). The 
subtitle to the two volumes gives an important clue to the basis of Rosenstock’s 
social philosophy: Volume One being The Excessive Power (Übermacht) of 
Spaces, Volume Two being The Full (or Complete) Count or (Number) of the 
Times. His social philosophy is concerned with how, when a world implodes on 
or devours them, through what he terms the four social diseases of anarchy, 
decadence, revolution and  war (1970a, 11-16), people can escape the tyranny of 
forces that have come to rule the space in which they dwell by founding a new 
time which will then open up other spatial possibilities. For him, then, the key to 
human freedom is the capacity both to found the new and draw upon the powers 
encapsulated in bodies of time past which enable us to live in a present in which 
we feel blessed by the future. Rosenstock-Huessy repeatedly argues that 
philosophy generally is particularly weak in assisting us with this task and it is 
ultimately to Sociology that  Rosenstock-Huessy turned as ‘the way to win again 
our freedom over spaces and through times’(1956, 23). Hence against the 
Cartesian cogito, which he saw as providing the underpinning formulation of the 
philosophy of modernity, Rosenstock-Huessy retorts with the much more archaic- 
Respondeo esti mutabor – ‘I respond although I will be changed’  (1938, 817-830; 
1970b, 17-33). In other words, we are fundamentally responsive creatures – and 
our creations are shaped by our responses either to the weight and push of the 
past, the burdens or joys of the present or the pull and call of the future. Like 
Vico, whom Rosenstock-Huessy greatly admired, he believes we are inescapably 
rooted in history, even though our great revolutions attempt to rip us out of it, in 
order to begin anew and build a much better world, thereby opening up new paths 
of self-hood and the world.5 
Philosophy’s major deficiency, for Rosenstock-Huessy, is that it is not sufficiently 
sensitive to time, speech or history. To a large extent this is because of logic itself 
as being timeless. As he says in ‘The Terms of the Creed,’ ‘logic is that mode of 
spiritual life in which the divinity of timing is omitted.’ Logic transports us out of 
time and offers the mind a stable, but unreal space.  For Rosenstock-Huessy, this 
search for a stable space is reflected in recurrent philosophical elements  which 
privilege the implacability of space (or a particular space) over the ceaselessness 
of time. Modern philosophy’s division of things into subject and object (a spatial 
configuration) is a case in point, but it goes back to the ancients whose building 
blocks such as topics (from topos place),  ‘categories’ (from kata ‘down to’ and 
agora ‘the public assembly’ i.e. declaiming in the assembly), reason’s 
sphericality, and ideas-(the very term idea, eidein = to see, referring to something 
                                                 
5 Stahmer and Gormann-Thelen (1998) correctly identify Vico, Hamann, Goethe, Saint-Simon and 
Paracelsus as being important spirits of inspiration for his work. 
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visible to the mind’s eye) all suggest a commitment to (the mental) space’s 
primacy.  The same point is made somewhat more elaborately in the first volume 
of the Sociology (280-284) where he argues that dialectical thought is triadic, but 
anything that really happens and makes itself manifest, i.e. appears (erscheint) is 
at least quadrilateral.6 It must be something in space and time, and hence conform 
to the inner/ outer-ness or subjective/objective matrix of space, as well as the 
trajective and prejective-ness of time. He called this four-fold matrix the cross of 
reality and it is applied repeatedly throughout his works. 
While, then, Rosenstock-Huessy provided a range of arguments against 
philosophers wanting to make more of reason and less of language, time and 
history than their due, and while he preferred to classify himself as a sociologist, 
he can also be seen as a social philosopher who argued for the philosophical 
necessity of the fusion of history, linguistics, anthropology, sociology and 
religion.  Franz Rosenzweig certainly saw Rosenstock-Huessy in this  light, and 
he once said to him: ‘You have never… been to me anything other than a 
“philosopher” (1969, 82).7 In this respect he belongs to that long line of critics of 
philosophy that range from ancients to moderns and comic poets to religious 
thinkers – from Aristophanes to Lucian to Rabelais to Tatian, to Tertullian to 
Luther to Pascal to Marx and Nietzsche. All these critics have provided criticisms 
of philosophy that have ended up, in different ways, and at different times, 
transforming the direction and content of philosophy. 
2. Life and Work.  
Eugen Rosenstock was born in 1888. His parents were assimilated (i.e. non 
religious) German Jews. His mother and father, a banker, encouraged academic 
pursuits in their children. At school his classes were in Latin, and from a young 
age Rosenstock devoted himself to history and linguistics. His passion for 
learning languages extended to teaching himself Egyptian hieroglyphics while a 
teenager. He is probably one of the very few social philosophers who (apart from 
his fluency in several modern European languages) not only read the biblical 
writers, ancient philosophers, poets, orators and Church fathers in their original 
languages, but was equally at home deciphering the walls of an Egyptian temple. 
This schooling formed the basis of an approach to reality which always 
considered the different underlying imperatives – divine and human – that fused a 
group or lead to its dissolution. It also provided him with what he insisted was a 
guiding methodological principle in his life: to make no historical argument that 
was not based upon his own consultation of the original source material. 
                                                 
6 The Kantianism of this particular formulation is deliberate. H=He argues, in this section, that 
Kant’s great service was in laying out  the limits of dialectic and logic and he credits Kant with 
laying out the method for sociological thinking. 
7 He also said that  Rosenstock-Huessy was the most important influence upon the development of 
his own ‘New Thinking.’ For his part, Rosenstock-Huessy not only saw himself as involved in a 
life-time’s dialogical project with Franz Rosenzweig, but he held that the true breakthrough in 
their contribution to speech thinking would only be grasped by readers who read them together – 
in all their differences. 
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He joined the Protestant church at 17. By his own account, this was not due to any 
great existential anxiety, but to having reached the conclusion at a very young age 
that what was stated in the Nicean Creed was manifestly obvious. (1970 b, 197). 
Rosenstock-Huessy insisted that Christianity was not a religion of transcendence 
and was not to be confused with Platonism of any sort, but was about building the 
ages or times to come in this world. It was first and foremost a discovery about 
the process of incarnation and the way to overcome social death. Nor for him was 
the Church, as it was, for example, for Karl Barth or Emil Brunner, for the great 
part a massive deviation from the gospel. Rather, not only in spite of, but to a 
significant extent because of its flaws, it was the story of the incarnation of the 
spirit and the recreation of human nature into a different body, the body of Christ. 
In other words, the task of the Church was that of making man like God, what the 
Church fathers in the Athanasian creed had called ‘anthropurgy’ (1946, 108). 
Such a core Christian terms as last judgment or redemption, then, had nothing to 
do with the  individual surviving after death in a place called heaven or hell (an 
idea he thought owed more to Plato than Jesus or Paul). Resurrection meant the 
resuscitation of seemingly historically spent forms of life so that their powers 
could be tapped for generations to come, while the last judgment was the 
deployment of all our force to prevent its continuing into the future. Thus in his 
‘Faculty Address on The Potential Christians of the Future Address:” 
  
And I know of the Last Judgment as a reality because I have seen Last 
Judgments passed on Proust’s France, on Rasputin’s Russia, on Wilhelm 
II’s Germany, President Harding’s America.  Similarly I believe in 
resurrection of the body because I see resurrections of bodies, all through 
history, on earth. Any genuine soul will be incarnated time and again. 
(1941, 11-12) 
 Examples of incarnations he mentions, beside Christ himself in the 
Church, are St. Francis in the Franciscan order and all its achievements, Leonardo 
Da vinci by succeeding generations of engineers, Sigmund Freund in the 
psychiatric movement, Marx in the workers’ movement and so on. (1956, 303-
309.)  
Rosenstock-Huessy studied jurisprudence and received his doctorate 
(Herzogsgewalt und Friedensschutz) from the University of Heidelberg at the age 
of 21, from which time he went on to teach at the university. He was also to 
receive a second doctorate in 1923 in Philosophy from the same university, for his 
Königshaus und Stämme in Deutschland zwischen 911 und 1250, a book he had 
published in 1914. His teachers included Rudolf Sohm and Otto Gierke, both key 
figures in the historical school of law. While he was not a disciple of either, 
throughout his life he would never cease writing on the growth and decay of 
socio-political formations and what forced people to hate one form of life and 
seek to found another.  
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Amongst his students was Franz Rosenzweig. In 1913, Rosenstock-Huessy played 
a pivotal role in convincing Rosenzweig that the ‘living God’ was not the God of 
metaphysics who, thankfully, had been pronouced dead by Nietzsche, but referred 
to a power more ‘meaningful’ and ‘truthful’ than could be accounted for by the 
limited powers of philosophy. By this he was not referring to any mystical 
powers, but the full gamut of creative, and redemptive powers which are created 
and revealed throughout the human story. In this respect he played an important 
role in convincing Rosenzweig that truth was not so much a property of things or 
states of affairs captured by the reflecting mind, but a state of fecundity produced 
by the act appropriate for the time in which it was performed. If Rosenstock-
Huessy can be said to have an epistemology which can be reproduced in one 
sentence, it is Goethe’s ‘What is fruitful, that alone is true,’ which is but a 
recasting of the biblical ‘by their fruits you shall know them.’(1968, 11) 
 In 1914, he met and married Margrit Huessy whom he loved dearly, raised a son 
with and remained  married to until she died in 1958. After her death he was 
joined by Freya von Moltke, who was to be his companion until his death. Freya 
von Moltke was the widow of his former student, Helmuth von Moltke, a key 
member of the Kreisau circle who was murdered near the conclusion of the World 
War 2 by Hitler. 
During the Great War Rosenstock-Huessy served as a captain in the German army 
where he fought on the Western front.  In 1916 he began an intense 
correspondence with Rosenzweig, now published in English as Judaism Despite 
Christianity, who by that time had decided not to follow Rosenstock and his 
cousins, the Ehrenbergs, into Christianity, but to fully embrace the Jewish faith 
into which he had been born.  That correspondence has remained a major post-
Nietzschean Christian/Jewish dialogue. While in that correspondence Rosenstock-
Huessy was uncompromising in his insistence that Judaism was a spent historical 
force, he continued to reflect upon Rosenzweig’s decision to remain a Jew 
throughout his life. He came to the opinion that Rosenzweig had convincingly 
demonstrated the eternal role of Judaism in the human story.  
A year after this exchange began Rosenzweig met and fell in love with 
Rosenstock-Huessy’s wife, Margrit or Gritli. Rosenstock  accepted, not without 
suffering (Stahmer, 2006), the love that had developed between his best friend 
and wife, and years later he would confide to his friend and devotee Georg Müller 
that Margrit had been Rosenzweig’s muse throughout the writing of The Star of 
Redemption, and, more precisely, that Rosenzweig’s understanding of  revelation 
which plays such a decisive role in that same work came directly out of his 
experience of his love for Gritli.  This has been born out in the relatively recent 
publication of Rosenzweig’s letters to Gritli (Briefe an Gritli) which has been the 
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biggest event in Rosenzweig scholarship since Edith Rosenzweig’s edition  of his 
Briefe in 1935.8 
Rosenstock-Huessy had entered the Great War a Christian Nationalist. By the 
War’s end he was convinced that Germany’s salvation required dropping all 
nationalist allegiances – its failure to do so, he predicted, would only throw it 
back again into further war. He also emerged from the War with an idea (first 
outlined in book-form in Die Hochzeit des Kriegs und der Revolution) that he 
would develop in Out of Revolution and Die europäischen Revolutioned und der 
Charakter der Nationen– that the Great War was the culmination of a millennium 
of revolutions and that it was these very catastrophes which provided the genesis 
of new and more powerful institutional bulwarks for what would become the 
fulfillment of the kingdom promised to the Jews and later to the human race 
through Christianity. 
A core element of Rosenstock’s social philosophy which emerged directly from 
his experience of the War and his subsequent ‘vision’ of the meaning of a 
thousand years of European wars and revolutions and political legacies was that 
suffering was a fundamental component of human learning. For the most part, and 
particularly socially, truth was something imprinted on us by pain and trauma 
rather than something merely learnt by candlelight. As he said bluntly in one 
public lecture: ‘suffering is the only source of wisdom, and not my brain here.’ 
(Cruciform Character of History - 1967 Vol 31 - Lecture 2 - March, 1967, Lecture 
(number-page) 2-014, Item number: 656, Reel number: 18). He develops this idea 
in ‘The Secret of the University’ in a manner which suggests we should be much 
more attentive to the catastrophic conditions under which any new philosophy 
emerges if we wish to see it in its proper light – philosophy being but one 
response to a social catastrophe which requires a great redirection of energies for 
society’s survival or complete overthrow and the establishment of  a new type.  
No philosopher ever sat down as if in a classroom to answer the questions 
of his predecessor.    To consider the history of philosophy in this way is 
insanity.   Descartes grew out of the Thirty Years War.    He has remained 
its eternal Privat-dozent.    Kant became a philosopher after the Seven 
Years War, Schopenhauer came to meditation on the battlefields of 
Napoleon. The Franco -Prussian War forced Friedrich Nietzsche  out of 
mere philology.   (Microfilm Reel 8, 8: 427, 4-5.) 
After the War Rosenstock-Huessy worked in Daimler Benz as an editor of a 
worker’s magazine before he returned to the academic life. The desire to bridge 
the divide between education and the world  remained a constant thread of 
Rosenstock’s life, including his being a founding member of institutions such as  
the Academy of Labor in Frankfurt (1921) and the German Academy for Volk 
Research and Adult Education (1926) and being Vice Chairman of the World 
                                                 
8 Available in full on the internet thanks to Michael Gormann-Thelen http://www.ka-
talog.de/eledition.htm   
 8 
Association of Adult Education (1928-1932). He was also a pioneer of the 
German  work service movement in Germany, which was designed to engage 
students with the rest of the community (a movement which was later to be 
politicized and corrupted by the Nazis), and, after emigrating to the United States, 
the establishment of Camp William James in Vermont, the last of which was 
undertaken as part of Franklin Roosevelt’s Civilian Conservation Corps. While 
having changed the lives of many of his students, it was, however, abandoned as a 
failure.  The importance of the fusion of education with work, for Rosenstock-
Huessy, was based on his fundamental belief that humanity would only free itself 
from the perils of its past by creative collective acts, including reinvigorating the 
institutions which had themselves emerged as responses to and ways out of 
catastrophes, as well as establishment of new institutions appropriate for the 
times. 
With Hitler’s coming to power in 1933, Rosenstock and his wife and son 
Hans left Germany. The émigré political scientist Carl Friedrich helped him get 
work at Harvard, but it was not a satisfying experience for him or many of his 
colleagues. He was forced to leave Harvard because he insisted that ‘God’ was a 
living presence in history. Seen in the light of ‘speech thinking,’ a core axiom of 
which is  that a name which generates reality (as God does through invocation, 
supplication, devotion and the like) is real (much realer, he insisted, than 
abstractions such as mind or body), it was the collision of two paradigms and their 
respective vocabularies: Rosenstock-Huessy’s ‘speech or dialogical-thinking’ 
with its anti-naturalism (ironically, in that environment, a voice of one) versus the 
naturalistically based behaviorism that then predominated. A good example of the 
different worlds that then predominated can be gauged from a comparison of 
Crane Brinton’s scathing comments on Out of Revolution (1939) and his 
withering retort in his review of Brinton’s The Anatomy of Revolution (1939). 
He ended up teaching social philosophy in Dartmoth where he remained for the 
rest of his academic career. While the stars of former friends and associates such 
as Buber and Tillich waxed in the United States, he was largely unknown and un-
listened to, except, in the main, for some devoted undergraduates who taped his 
undergraduate lectures for posterity. He had not been completely forgotten in 
Germany, where his post-war lectures were well attended and his books reviewed 
in newspapers. While his name still crops up from time to time in European 
history or sociological works (his Die europaischen Revoltutionen is something of 
a German minor classic in European Studies), Rosenstock-Huessy’s ideas have 
not received a large audience. In part, at least, this has to do with his failure to 
conform to conventional academic categories of classification and scholarly 
protocols and disciplinary requirements, in particular the theological/ secular 
divide. In addition, there was almost no prevailing mood which Rosenstock-
Huessy’s thought seemed to tap into: neither the aesthetic/ literary mood of 
modernism (in general Rosenstock-Huessy thought art was play – and the period 
which spanned two world wars was not a time in which play would help stave off 
the next catastrophe); nor the subsequent radical student mood which Marxian 
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based social theories attended to (Rosenstock-Huessy, thought neo-Marxists of all 
kinds to be a hundred years out of date); nor the psychoanalytic movement that 
derived from Freud or Jung (he deeply mistrusted psychiatry, believing it placed 
too much weight upon the ego and did not adequately grasp the collective socio- 
historical formations which shape it); nor phenomenology, whose dependence 
upon lived experience was  closer in spirit to his own thought, but, nevertheless, 
its purview remained insufficiently dialogical and insufficiently institutional for 
him to see much value in it. He was also unforgiving of Heidegger (as he was of 
Carl Schmitt whom, before Hitler’s rise to power, he had once been on cordial 
terms with) and in the Sociology, he recounts, with contempt, a story in which 
Elfride Heidegger talks of her husband and her having to weigh up whether they 
would back the Marxists or the Nazis (1958, 52-53). The proliferation of work in 
linguistics which might have seemed to have provided him with natural allies did 
not help his case because he was deeply opposed to what he thought was the 
prevailing atomistic and unduly scientistic approach to the study of language. 
Mauthner and Sausurre, for example, he thought were so wrong they barely 
warranted engaging with. And someone like C.S. Pierce whose pragmaticism has 
certain affinities with Rosenstock-Huessy’s understanding of truth also differs 
from Rosenstock-Huessy in its preoccupation with ‘reasonable’ and ‘objective 
statements’ as  the road to truth. He saw himself much more in the more 
organicist tradition of Humboldt and was glad to find in R.A. Wilson’s The 
Miraculous Birth of Language a contemporary linguist who had reached some 
similar conclusions to him about language’s role and character in our social 
evolution. 
This lack of academic ‘fit’ was a fact not lost him and in the final paragraph of his 
Out of Revolution he wrote, with an eye as much to his Harvard experience as to 
his awareness of how he was being read: 
…I have survived decades of study and teaching in scholastic and 
academic sciences. Every one of their venerable scholars mistook me for 
their intellectual type which he most despised. The atheist wanted me to 
disappear into Divinity, the theologians into sociology, the sociologists 
into history, the historians into journalism, the journalists into 
metaphysics, the philosophers into law, and – need I say it? – the lawyers 
into hell, which as  a member of our present world I have never left. For 
nobody leaves hell all by himself without going mad. (1938, 758) 
By the time Rosenstock-Huessy died in 1973 he had left behind a huge corpus 
ranging from his two volume Soziologie, the second volume of which is an 
attempt at universal history, to the aforementioned works on revolution, to a 
collection of essays and small books gathered in a two volume work on language, 
Die Sprache des Menschengesclechts, to a three volume work on church history 
(with Joseph Wittig), Das Alter der Kirche,9  to various writings on grammar, 
                                                 
9 Wittig was a Catholic priest, who had been excommunicated from the Church. The book was, in 
part, a defense of Wittig’s orthodoxy.  
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biblical interpretation, Egyptology, Medieval history, industrial law, organization 
of the work place and much else.  
A few years before he died, a former student, Clinton Gardner, had formed Argo 
press, to keep his work alive. Another student, Harold  Stahmer, had written 
introductions in English to some of his works, and a Gesellschaft had been started 
in Germany (both still exist) which still produces a journal/ newsletter, Stimmstein 
devoted to his work, influence and issues that might be of interest to his readers. 
In 1972 four families in Holland set up a Rosenstock-Huessy house in Haarlem to 
put Rosenstock-Huessy’s ideas about adult education and voluntary service into 
practice by providing accommodation for people in a crisis. Thanks to the labours 
of Lise van der Molen and the efforts and donations of the Rosenstock-Huessy 
foundation a dvd edition of his collected works has been created. After his death 
W.H. Auden, who first met Rosenstock-Huessy, in 1938 and who wrote a Preface 
to a collection of his writings published by Argo in 1970 under the salient title I 
am an Impure Thinker wrote the valedictory poem, ‘Aubade,’ which was 
published in The New Atlantic. 
 
3. Speech, Time, History 
 
In Ja und Nein, a work written a little over four years before his death, 
Rosenstock-Huessy thanked  Georg Müller for having summed up seven decades 
of thought in the three words: speech, time, history. ‘I seem’ he says ‘to have 
pursued the daily life of peoples and their members as reflections of this trinity. I 
have looked at the speech of individuals and nations, the times of lovers and 
haters, the history of empires, the church and society as the reflections of the 
divine trinity.’ (1968, 9). These three terms not only sum up the orientation of 
Rosenstock-Huessy’s life work they also provide the key to understanding where 
he thinks philosophy has gone wrong.  
For Rosenstock-Huessy speech’s significance was not to describe a litany of 
factual statements about the world of the sort ‘it is raining’ – see’ “Es Regnet” 
oder die Sprache steht auf dem Kopf” in Die Sprache des Menschengeschlects). 
Nor is it, as Saussure held, simply a means of A expressing his or her intention to 
B.  Moreover,  Rosenstock-Huessy’s interest in speech is restricted to what he 
calls in The Origins of Speech, authentic speech – it is not the kind speech which 
has its parallels in  the animal kingdom – such as the calls of care and tenderness 
from mother to child and from mother bear to baby bear – but the  foundation and 
perpetuation of constitutions, institutions – social acts that reach across 
generations and establish patterns of social complexity which show us the 
difference in our self- and world-making and that of animals.  
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We exist in a social reality which has been made by others and which we make 
for others. And thus speech gives us a plasticity which separates us from other 
animals and which enables us to work with time and space like no other species 
familiar to us. Speech is the way that we reorganize the universe, (1970a, 19)  
No language is communication with others only, it is communication with 
the universe. We try by speaking to communicate our experience of the 
universe to our fellow men; by listening, reading, learning, we try to get 
hold of their experience of the universe. To speak means to reenact cosmic 
processes so that these processes may reach others. In every sentence, man 
acts within the cosmos and establishes a social relation for the sake of 
saving the cosmos from wasting acts in vain. Man economizes the cosmic 
processes by making them available to all other men. Man, by speech, 
establishes the solidarity of all men for the acceptance of our universe. 
(1970a, 122-123) 
That solidarity is ultimately historical, for it is only by being able to draw upon 
the powers of the past and future that the human being can survive the crises of 
their present. Thus speech and history form an indissoluble connection. As he 
says in his ‘First Cycle of Letters to Cynthia,’ ‘Language is the vehicle on which 
history invades the animal life of man. And the study of history and the study of 
language are one and the same study.’ (1943, 173) 
Speech, then, is a responsive and creative act in which we discover things about 
ourselves, each other and the world itself we would never have chanced upon had 
we not the power to reframe the universe through speech – speech accounts for 
our unpredictable nature. And a large part of Rosenstock-Huessy’s objection to 
naturalism is that either it ignores speech completely and reduces us to more basic 
animal or physical processes, or, if it does take account of speech it places speech 
on the same continuum as animal cries and calls.  
The social character of speech also means that it is not only a matter of what is 
being said when we speak to one another, but also who is talking to whom – what 
a father says to a child, a president to his or her people, friends to one another etc.. 
As he writes in Ja und Nein, 
In speech it is not a matter of  what I think about myself, or even just what 
I say, rather it’s a matter of how we address each other reciprocally. We 
don’t speak, as the semanticists declare, to understand something. We 
speak, so that each understands the other through the manner that we 
address him and we ourselves through the way he address us. Each man 
proceeds thus: A false address can irritate someone for the entire day. 
Because speech comes into the world in order to ensure that your 
representation of me and mine of you is situated in the right places in the 
cosmos. (1968, 23.)  
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This one example shows how Rosenstock-Huessy differs from Saussurian 
linguistics which break up the world into the units of language irrespective of how 
language circulates socially.  It also shows how far removed Rosenstock-Huessy 
is from the naturalistic based philosophical models which see the world as an 
object to be understood.  For Rosenstock-Huessy, the truth of the world we 
participate in - which includes the panoply of names and concepts and theories 
which we ascribe to nature - could never have been ‘noticed’ by a disinterested 
scientific spectator some three thousand years ago because it wasn’t there yet. It 
takes time for us and our truths to become created and revealed to us and speech 
is the power of disclosing us to each other and ourselves, in part through our 
respective roles which enable us to preside over a particular domain of ‘powers.’ 
Speech takes and makes time. In an important sense, for Rosenstock-Huessy, 
speech is revelation which is, in turn, orientation which is also a process of mutual 
development: 
The double character of revelation consists in the way in  which it 
allocates to the speaker as much as to the people whom the speaker sees 
before him, a new and at the same time a determined place.. revelation is 
orientation. Orientation is a correlation between at least two new poles; 
one may call it a ‘correspondence’, because this relationship between two 
letter writers  is today more likely to be understood than between two 
speakers. In a correspondence two speakers respond in such a manner that 
the more the longer it continues the more each correspondent becomes 
polarized in his own character. (1968, 21) 
In speech then we really make each other and hence we are literally for 
Rosenstock-Huessy the word made flesh. The corollary of this which is that ‘we 
ourselves become structured by grammar.’  He puts it more forcefully when he 
writes ‘most men are shards of broken grammar,’(1968, 37 and 43) and he went 
so far as to hold that grammar is the key to us as social organisms. In keeping 
with this he proposed a re-working of the social sciences on the basis of a 
grammatical revolution. Indeed, he believes that as things are now the social 
sciences rest on a grammar that is akin to Ptolemaic astronomy. (See ‘Die 
kopernikanische Wendung der Grammatik’ in Die Sprache des 
Menschengeschlechts)  
 Very briefly, he argues that the intellectual life of nations, and the professions 
which give us social orientation, are responses to the universe seeking its own 
enhancement through the distribution of tasks and activities  which have a 
grammatical underpinning. Thus deploying the quadrilateral matrix, which he 
argues in his The Excessive Power of Spaces is necessary for correctly observing 
any social reality, he argues that our experiences will be accumulated and 
devolved through these spatial/ temporal grammatical modules so that  
 
the subjunctive of grammar, in the life of a great nation, is represented by 
music, by poetry, by all the arts. The equations of our calculating logic are 
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spread out in all the sciences and techniques. The trajective, linking us 
with the living past, lives in us through all the traditions. The prejective is 
represented by prophecy, ethics, programmatic movements.(1970a, 187) 
 
Accordingly the professions of lawyers, preachers, artists and scientists are 
grammatical necessities, each profession accentuating an aspect of reality whose 
grammatical mode is the trajective, prejective, subjective and objective 
respectively. For Rosenstock-Huessy, a society’s survival and development 
depends very much on its ability adequately cope with its inner and outer spatial 
and trajective and projective temporal potencies. We need to work with all these 
potencies and the great danger of philosophy is that it elevates its own importance 
– and the procedures and grammatical elements which constitute it - at the 
expense of other potencies which are only disclosed and developed through other 
grammatical elements and procedures. In this respect, Rosenstock-Huessy sees 
that when philosophy tries to dominate society it does so at the expense of other 
powers of society and hence ultimately is pernicious. Its main deficiency lies in its 
under-appreciation of the fecundity and importance of the poly-form nature of 
speech.  
And, for the most part, he complains, linguistics has followed philosophy, in 
elevating the mind above speech, even in materialistic philosophies, as if the mind 
itself is the real thinker and speech simply a rather poor means to get from a to b.  
(‘Fritz Mauthner wrote 6000 pages and proved in one and a half million words 
that all words lie,’ complains Rosenstock-Huessy (1962 Vol.1, 554) .According to 
Rosenstock-Huessy such approaches to speech all follow what he calls  ‘the 
abstract madness of the school grammar’, which he says makes the mistake of 
explaining, what he calls, ‘the last grammatical creation: the declarative sentence 
‘these are’ as the beginning of speech.’ In fact, he says, a declarative sentence is: 
 only a conclusion, behind which it has to be started again from the 
beginning. From the declarative sentence nothing ensues for the future. 
That’s why no knowledge of nature helps us to answer the question how 
we should live.. The bible with its ‘let  there be light’ and ‘there was light’ 
has the experiential demonstrable grammar. Imperative (prejective), 
conjunctive or optative (subjective), preterite or perfect (trajective), 
neutral indicative (objective) are grammatical necessities arising out of 
times and spaces. A higher scientific grammar  can exist because from 
now we can see the  modes, the tenses, persons in a completely different 
way to the Alexandrians. (1968, 32) 
For Rosenstock-Huessy, the Alexandrian grammar table,  which was originally 
developed in the 4th century BC as part of larger pedagogical architectonic of the 
sciences  and which is still the standard manner of grammar instruction, has been 
one of the great hidden obstacles to understanding real or speech thinking. His 
claim is that the Alexandrian architectonic carries with it a specific orientation to 
ourselves and reality whose core elements mistakenly become solidified and 
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privileged and passed on as if reality itself were essentially – always and 
everywhere - composed of its elements. In particular it privileges the dis-
interested, impersonal, reflective mode, which breaks up the world into subject 
and predicate, subject and object. This orientation also brings everything under 
the rule of the indicative mood of the declarative sentence.   
It is this emphasis upon the declarative sentence, which provides the answer to 
‘what is?’ that lies behind the repeated accusation he makes against philosophy is 
that it has instrumentalized speech. As Rosenstock-Huessy says in ‘The Race of 
Thinkers or the Knackersyard of Faith’ (1962, Vol. 2, 612): ‘The scandalous [and 
terrific and unheard] claims of the thinkers consist in this: that first they think, and 
only after that do they mis-advisedly or treacherously disclose  what they think to 
us with the help of speech as their tool.’10  
Of course, philosophy also from its inception appealed to the possibility of 
philosophy to judge the world and thus the importance to it of the subjunctive or 
optative mood, so that it oscillated between these two moods, veering more 
toward the former in its naturalist variants which culminate in modern natural 
scientistic metaphysics of the kind we find in Spinoza or toward the subjunctive/ 
optative in more morally or aesthetically driven metaphysics. As he wrote in his 
early work Applied Science (or Know How) of the Soul: 
 
Things controlled by the indicative are calmly dismissed into the world 
The indicative describes and tells about things which are resting, which 
have been, which are finished or at  hand….Being and existence are 
indeed the epitome of the indicative in all its varieties, because it “allows” 
something to be said about the world….The philosophy which deifies man 
is called Idealism since it thrives on freedom of the will.  Freedom, 
however, is the most pithy expression for the subjunctive which expresses 
everything coming to be. Freedom is the most pithy expression for not 
wanting to obey yet the laws of existence, for wishing to think of oneself 
not as part of the world but as divinely inspired, as an Idealist.(1924, 14)  
 
                                                 
10 The German is ‘Die unerhörte Behauptung der Denker geht dahin, daß sie erst 
denken, und dann erst das, was sie denken, mit Hilfe der Sprache als ihres 
Werkzeuges, uns verraten.’ It is the use of unerhörte and verraten that makes the 
polemic work so well in German and so hard to ‘get’ in English,  because these 
words express such fundamentally different and even contrary tones/ ideas/ words 
in English and Rosenstock-Huessy means all the contraries: ‘unerhörte’ can be 
translated as unbelievable/ unheard/ impermissible/ terrific/ scandalous’ and 
‘verraten’ as disclose/ or betray.) 
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Also: 
 
 
Philosophy in which the intellect lets everything revolve around the “I” 
starts with the assumption of eternal freedom. Natural science, 
emphatically revolving around the “it”, starts with the principles of law. 
(1924, 42)  
 
In Kant’s distinction between theoretical and practical reason exemplifies how 
this move from indicative to subjunctive is attempted – as the categorical 
imperative first requires acknowledging that the will (the base of the subjunctive) 
is only free when it is not in violation of the laws potentially knowable by 
theoretical reason (the indicative). Thus when Kant says that he wishes to create a  
rational faith by defining the limits of experience, just as when he says that ought 
implies can , from Rosenstock-Huessy’s perspective, he is really showing that the 
entire metaphysical edifice is derived from a lexical ordering of grammar. 
The architecture of the Alexandrian grammar was itself a result of the central role 
that it had ascribed to philosophy in the sciences so it should come as no surprise 
about its concurrence with philosophy in grammatical priorities. To a large extent 
it does this because it has already made some fundamental linguistic 
commitments which Rosenstock-Huessy thinks have plagued philosophy from its 
very inception and whose span can be witnessed from Parmenides to Heidegger, 
and which he also sees as repeatedly dragging philosophy and its followers into 
phantasmic pursuits. 
In the first instance and what he calls its break from ‘aboriginal humanity’ comes 
from a grammatical preference to deal in pronominals rather than names. (1970b, 
77-90) 
Rosentsock-Huessy argues that it is not only from the moment of birth one is 
inducted via names- the names of one’s parents, their family, one’s birthplace, 
one’s own name, but our life is a continuous accrual of names  as each gathers 
around him or herself a cluster of adjectives that reflect one’s responses to the c 
callings and  imperatives of one’s parents, one’s friends, one’s teachers, one’s 
spouse and children, one’s colleagues, one’s government, one’s society, and, far 
from being least, one’s enemies. Naming is orientating. As he says in Ja und 
Nein: 
In   every healthy society, one is inducted and introduced (vorgestellt), 
because life continues as a chain of people and things who have been 
introduced/ represented (Vorgestellten). That’s how one enters history, in 
so far as one asks after my name and then one acclaims the other…The 
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human world does not consist of ‘will and representation’ but as love and 
introduction/representation.  (1968, p. 22)11 
Names, then, refer to dynamic processes that move over time. On the other 
hand pronominals transport us beyond those processes to something more stable; 
they take us out of the specific relationship and have us think about relationships  
in a more general manner. As with Schelling’s distinction between positive and 
negative philosophy and the limits of the later, Rosenstock-Huessy is highly 
suspicious of abstraction and he believes that philosophers have tended to put too 
much faith in them, believing that they provide the magic key for bringing order 
into the disorder of the world. The accusation by Socrates that his interlocutors do 
not have a specific virtue unless they can provide a logically tight definition for 
‘what (the specific) virtue is,’ and the Parmenidian formulation that ‘being is’ are, 
for Rosenstock-Huessy, but variants of this mistaken grammatical faith.  
For Rosenstock-Huessy, the problem with the kind of case Plato makes in 
favor of essences and against names in the Cratylus (where he provides a satire on 
the sophists’ use of etymology) is that the essence is purchased at the expense of 
the many processes which names rightly recognize as many. Of course Plato 
insists that the one and the many must be brought into the  union of knowledge’s 
correct definition. But Rosenstock-Huessy argues that names  are primarily an 
historical founding, and hence not a logical matter. Rosenstock-Huessy 
emphasized this point in his ‘Lectures on Greek Philosophy of 1956’ when he 
contrasted  Book 2 of the Iliad with Plato. That is where Homer recalls the ships 
and the names of the places and commanders of the different armies of the 
Greeks. ‘Homer's heart,’ he says, ‘is in following the first impressions also in the 
physical, in the real life…He's not systematic. He's anti-philosophical…Because a 
philosopher must have all his material gathered before he can subdivide it … 
Therefore it's always a second impression, it's an afterthought.’ Whereas the 
                                                 
11 Vorstellung is translated here as ‘ ‘introduction’ which follows on from the 
previous discussion, but in the final line – taken from Schopenhauer’s work of 
that name - Rosenstock-Huessy is playing with the fine line that exists between 
the terms representation/imagination/ idea and introduction (Schopenhauer’s book 
is translated either as The World as Will and Representation or The World as Will 
and Idea.)  Indeed the world Vorstellung has an important but shifting 
philosophical pedigree in German idealism: for Kant it is the basis of concepts 
and intuitions (Anschauungen), for Hegel the preliminary form of the concept 
before it is specified and developed as idea, hence he associates it with feelings 
and its proper sphere of expression is art. But Rosenstock-Huessy goes back to the 
much more basic everyday use of the term in sich vorstellen meaning ‘to 
introduce oneself,’ which also has resonances of  presentation – as in ‘I would 
like to present myself,’ ‘to show you myself,’ ‘to be in your circle.’ One might 
add this initial act of presentation is the condition of re-presentation, of the 
Stellung - the condition/ position/ emplacement - that is set before us.  
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philosopher is suspicious of the same name that may be concealing different 
essences, Homer is not interested if two people have the same name in trying to 
establish a common essence, but in this naming of the ships ‘poetry has to keep 
the individual names of every one city here.’ (1956b, Vol. 6, Oct 18)  
Unlike a pronoun, a specific name locates, sums up, emphasizes an event 
that has been or will become; it is done to orientate (even if, as in a lie, to veil). 
As Rosenstock-Huessy says 
 
The political power of names makes people circulate. Names signify our 
division of labor. They make room for a man and a thing. The "throne," 
the "hustings," our "tongue" as Greeks, the "eye of justice," the "thunder 
of Zeus," those were all names whose invocation made people move out or 
in…. 
Names make no sense unless they stand in mutual relation. Mother is not 
mother unless she may call, under the law, somebody the father. Brother is 
brother to a sister. And unless he calls her sister and she calls him brother, 
the name is worthless. The general and the sergeant, the master and the 
apprentice, the army and the navy make room for each other, in the 
wonderful whole of names. All names belong to this holon, to society. No 
name is good without the others. The Pan of the universe drives people 
panicky, that is they lose speech. The holon of the city gives everybody a 
name in such a manner that everybody else now can be named by him, 
too. (1970b, 83-84) 
 
On the other hand, a pro-noun is a way of not being precise about location, 
emergence, faith, hope, or love etc.  
 
Pronouns are a compromise between the real name of a person or a thing 
and the pointing finger while such person or thing is within the reach of 
our sense perception. To call a spade a spade is one thing; to point to the 
spade while it lies before us, which simply requires the gesture and a 
"there!," is a totally different act. One is the act of naming, the other is an 
attempt to reduce naming to its informal minimum. (1970b, 82) 
 
For Rosenstock-Huessy the problem of names is also a key component in 
the dispute between Heraclitus’ flux and Parmenides’ sphere of being. Like 
Nietzsche, he saw the two philosophies represent the choice between one path 
generally not taken by philosophers (Heraclitus’) which would enable us to enter 
more deeply into the tensions and struggles of life, and another (the road more 
traveled of Parmenides) which stabilizes and logicizes and hence simplifies the 
abstract world, thus making it of very limited real worth for orientating us in life. 
In what he calls a ‘conjuration’, a letter he composes from Heraclitus to 
Parmenides, he has Heraclitus say to Parmenides: “Being” is the scalp of the 
divine acts and the political names. This scalp hangs dangling on your belt, To 
hell with your “pronoun,” to hell with your “pro-verb” “being.” Or we shall all 
find ourselves in hell.’ (1970b, 90) 
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In Ja und Nein he make the point that what is done with nouns is also done 
with verbs, most notably in the case of philosophy with the verb sein (to be)/ noun 
Das Sein which is then rendered as being, which he sees as simply the dead husk 
or the smoke of what once had life. 
Children say ‘you,’ ‘I’, ‘there,’ ‘here’ ..Philosophers though love one 
pronoun above all others: the little word being.’ Being involves the loss of 
seeing and hearing (Sein. Da vergehen ihm Hören und Sehen). He wants 
to ground being. ‘Being’ (‘Das Sein’) along with the forms am, are, is, is a 
pro-verb in exactly the same way as ‘this’ is a pronoun. The famous 
copula ‘is’ stands for all verbs as a stenophon, an abbreviation One can 
only be talk of being, who experiences all verbs and cites them as ‘being.’ 
Because pronouns are senseless without the words for which they stand. 
Most philosophies of being speak of ‘being,’ without having drunk from 
and been sated by the fullness of all verbs; that’s why they are noise and 
smoke, and that’s why the existentialists explained the war to them. There 
is only the essence of God after you have experienced that God rages, 
creates, blesses and shakes up. (1968, 38-39) 
 
The great choice for post-Nietzschean thinking, for Rosenstock-Huessy, is not so 
much as Heidegger believed a choice between continuing to remain entrapped in 
our compliance with beings rather than Being, but between  continuing to take our 
orientation from pronominals rather than be more attentive to names. In this 
respect Heidegger is Greek – i.e. still philosophical -, whereas Rosenstock-Huessy 
is (to use  a much loved word of Heidegger) genuinely ‘primordial’ or pre-
philosophical because he thinks the pre-philosophical was wiser in its fidelity to 
language. Moreover, from Rosenstock-Huessy’s perspective  what Heidegger has 
in common with the essentialist thinking he is so critical of is that he still fools 
himself into thinking that he is not part of the great events of historical 
experiences that are encapsulated in names, that with thought he can move 
beyond them – but the thought itself, for Heidegger, when it is not merely 
pronominal pro-verbial thought is so saturated in history it cannot be overleaped 
except by a social rupture and new social foundational act and name.12 From 
Rosenstock-Huessy’s perspective, Heidegger’s deployment of Being as a gesture 
of defiance against the technicity into which the world has fallen is precisely the 
same kind of optatively governed gesture which characterizes the philosopher’s 
freedom (an aesthetic/ moral one). Heidegger’s reference, in his Der Spiegel 
Interview of 1966, to him awaiting a new god, who must remain nameless, on an 
earth from which the gods have fled is, from Rosenstock-Huessy’s perspective, 
indicative of just how barren is his landscape of possibilities. For all his talk, then, 
of being beyond metaphysics, from Rosenstock-Huessy’s perspective, Heidegger 
is so afraid of repeating its gestures and moves he is imprisoned by it. He is still 
                                                 
12 Ereignis – event- is of course a core category in Heidegger, but to the extent that it is not bound 
up with specific named events means that it functions in a purely abstract way. 
 19 
primarily a philosopher, and far less a Mensch, as the new thinkers like 
Rosenstock-Huessy sought to be, exercising ‘common sense’ and working with 
the common stock of names.  
By appealing to the primacy of names, Rosenstock-Huessy is not saying that one 
must always accept one’s tradition. Traditions have to constantly be reinvented or 
reconfigured – but he does dispute that the basis of that transformation is 
primarily a philosophical act, as if the disinterested philosopher could digest and 
judge everything with his or her own mind. Names are constantly being 
renegotiated and ‘to think means to introduce better names.’(1970 a, 174)  But for 
the most part this process occurs through the trial and catastrophes of events and a 
social consensus about the meaning of the event. Tracing the naming of what is 
now known as the holocaust is one example of how naming is often a matter of 
trial and error before there is a consensus about which name is appropriate for the 
experience that has traumatized a group and which that social group wishes to 
embed in its collective/institutional memory and pass onto future generations.  
(1970a, 174) 
The downgrading of the importance of the name in philosophy, for Rosenstock-
Huessy, has as its counterpart the downgrading of the vocative case and hence the 
dialogical component of truth. In Ja und Nein he contrasts the difference between 
the vocative which is part of the practice of dialogue and truth formation and 
beginning with the abstract  nominative, the ‘thing’ to be adjudged 
philosophically. ‘Vocatives create the preconditions for reciprocal 
communication; whereas nominatives and other cases take their place inside of 
communication. The vocative provokes the conversation.’ (1968, 25) And: 
The vocative means: turn around and face me; we want to talk with each 
other for a while. Such a summons, invitation, challenge, introduction sets 
men in motion. The other cases enable all the named to have their place. 
The vocative, however, turns them around!’…The nominative only points 
to different things, how they stand or lay …but the vocative belongs in the 
conjugation. The caller and the called belong in the conjugation. (1968, 
26) 
Contrast this, for a moment, with the Socratic and more modern Cartesian 
traditions. In both the concrete self dissolves either into the object to be studied or 
into the cognitive or methodological rules of the transcendental subject. In both 
instances the truth is the objective fact or state of affairs. But for Rosenstock-
Huessy what is being left out of this picture is the participative role we all have in 
world-making and that role brings with it a knowledge and sense of our own 
purposefulness. What is so important for Rosenstock-Huessy is that in the 
moment of creative address because the social world is generated by decisive acts 
of inspiration and our history is a tapestry of those acts – they are not predictable 
or rather they need not be predictable – the more predictable they are and become, 
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the more it shows us that the particular group who have acted so predictably have 
been reduced to being a dead automaton.   
This lack of emphasis  upon the vocative is closely related to Rosenstock-
Huessy’s attempt to redress what he sees as the over accentuation of the modern 
faith in analysis, which is part of its philosophical legacy and also part of 
philosophy’s aspiration to rule. According to Rosenstock-Huessy, the real 
sequence of orientation is: Obey, communicate, explain, systematize. 
 In the first instance one hears a name called out above one, then one 
communicates with another, who participates in the same named group as 
him. In the third we report, everything that has been done and has 
happened under this name; we report, we explain and we establish what is 
happening. Finally we oversee everything and compare and draw the sum 
of everything into a logical system. We analyze. (1968, 32) 
Analysis, then, is the conclusion of  a process and at no stage does Rosenstock-
Huessy claim that analysis or philosophy are completely unhelpful – but their 
benefits require that they are part of a linguistic whole and that whole is what 
forms the social organism within which philosophy may play its role. According 
to Rosenstock-Huessy, philosophy tends to mistake the part for the whole and the 
small measure of reason we have for being powerful enough to be the measure of 
all. Whereas the process briefly described above is what forms the collective ‘we’ 
and this formation of the ‘we’ is at the basis of all common endeavors and it is as 
much the case for philosophers or natural scientists –for the group  of ‘analysts’ - 
as for any group. While science tends to concentrate on the array of its results and 
the application of methods and experiments etc. which achieve them, no less real 
are the human and institutional processes that are involved  - the audacity of 
Galileo, the sweat and sacrifice of a science student to learn difficult material, the 
solidarity in pursuit of the truth about nature’s workings are all indispensable to 
science and enable scientists to share a common pursuit and what Rosenstock-
Huessy calls a particular ‘present’ in a ‘time body.’  As he writes in his 
Soziologie: 
 Only because all physicists describe one Physics, because  “Physics” has 
existed from 1600 to 1950  only thanks to this omnipresence of Physics 
for 350 years is the chain of experiments and mistakes meaningful. 
Physics can make gigantic mistakes and false teachings, a thousand times 
more than a single mortal, because it has a great present, on which the 
most distant future and the oldest past work. (1956, 290.) 
In contrast, then, to real speech which is developed over time, Rosenstock-Huessy 
sees that  ‘philosophy talks to man as though the experiment of living had not yet 
taken place before the experiment, so to speak. "Reason" always argues before the 
event, before our soul, has been incarnated, before God has come into the world.’ 
(1941, 6) Philosophy is able to occupy a zone in which our problems and its 
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solution are ‘eternalized – it stops time and that shows in its solutions. In sum it is 
a-historical, while our challenges and crises are in history and in time.  
Although other philosophers, in particular  Heidegger, Schelling and Bergson 
make time important, Rosenstock-Huessy was also not at all convinced that they 
had done it sufficiently. In the case of Schelling and Bergson it was because they 
remained imprisoned by the mechanistic conception of sequential time in which 
past, present and future move in the one direction. Thus in the opening chapter of 
Volume 2 of the Soziologie he takes issue with Schelling’s declaration in the Ages 
of the World that ‘the past is known, the future cognized, the future intimated’ 
(1958, 16-19)– for while Schelling is a major critic of mechanistic philosophy and 
his call for a narrative philosophy is explicitly acknowledged by Franz 
Rosenzweig as being one of the most important precursors of the new thinking, 
the notion of time expressed here is decisively sequential and not at all at odds 
with the mechanistic conception of time which has evolved out of philosophy.13  
While such a representation of space/ time as one finds in the new sciences of the 
philosophies of Descartes, Newton and Kant (for all their inner variants) certainly 
enables the sharpening  of  our understanding and observation of causal or 
material process, socially and personally we experience time as the push of the 
past and future. Our present is not simply a passing point on a one way flow, but 
the intersection of past and future in our present – future coming back to us as 
much as past coming toward us, which, he believed, is how we experience the 
historical catastrophes which come from the conflict between suffocating spaces 
and the freedom to found a new time. Heidegger’s emphasis upon thrown-ness 
and projection make him much closer to Rosenstock-Huessy, but his substitution 
of historicity for real history and hence real times, evident in the above discussion 
on names, remains a dividing line between them. 
For Rosenstock-Huessy because purposefulness (trajectiveness and 
prejectiveness) is integral to being, time is nuanced– as it is grammatically – and 
pluralised as it is institutionally – institutions are the way in which a particular 
coalition of temporal forces coalesce and reproduce themselves. ‘Without a 
multiplicity of times,’ he says ‘I remain speechless.’ (1968, 12)  
Moreover, for Rosenstock-Huessy, time and passion and history form an 
important connection which all come together in speech. Above all time is 
experienced as history – and this is as much so individually as collectively; just as 
history is not simply a sequential flow of forces which have their naturalistic 
counterparts. Rather different events stamp themselves in the hearts and minds of 
a people and continue to impact upon a group long after their existence, thereby, 
at different times and to different degrees, activating passions of subsequent 
                                                 
13 For his critique of Bergson 1963, 529-530. For Rosenstock-Huessy, the mechanistic 
deployment of time is simply the reproduction of philosophy’s hidden presumption of the 
superiority of space. Again the point is visible in Kant who makes time the condition of the 
transcendental imagination and hence of the categories, but time can only be verified by being 
represented as an imagined line, i.e. by the invocation of the inner intuition of the form of space. 
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generations. And much of Rosenstock-Huessy’s work is devoted the great 
‘events’, the great catastrophes, and time bodies ensuing from them which have 
given us our particular historical character. More generally, this activation of the 
passions by past events, for Rosenstock-Huessy, and the replacement of one 
pantheon of names for another as a hateful future is replaced by the promise of 
one more venerable is  a fundamental aspect of world-making and it is ultimately 
why for him names are so important. Names are testimonies to events and just as 
our speech is a means to activate us, names are the fundamental triggers of the 
passions and hence of our world making; they are the testimonies of what we 
love, what call us to act or what have become so hateful that new directions must 
be opened up and new names given to them. History is a great pantheon of names 
which are the register of passions and total commitments past – when those names 
no longer em-passion that component of a group’s history is dead.  
History, though, is not simply a plurality of names – Rosenstock-Huessy argued 
that it also tends toward a common story, as speakers and listeners are forced by 
successive catastrophes to become increasingly integrated into common spaces 
and times and to see the connection between the times and hence between each 
other. Such a connection can only be a real connection if it takes account of the 
bloody conflicts and the different responses and causes behind war and revolution 
as much as the moments and successes of common cause. That is, it must be 
multi-vocular, but being multi-vocular is not the same as being an archipelago of 
hermetically sealed cries; history provides the difference between Babel (the 
interminable inability to communicate one’s suffering and one’s love, faith and 
hopes) and a possible common future. ‘All history is the tale of acts in which 
some speaker and some listener have become one.’ (1970a,109) It is the formation 
of ‘We. ’ Thus, he says, in  Ja und Nein,  ‘we discover the founding act of life as 
the shaking up or shock (Erschütterung) of a man so that he is he is activated, 
finally activated and called upon to join in the formation of history in his own 
name.’(1968, 26) 
What ultimately concerns Rosenstock-Huessy is incarnation and he believes that 
philosophy not only has not been sufficiently attentive to the process of  
incarnation and its historical importance, but that religions, especially Christianity 
have been far more successful in their fruits than philosophy – a claim he attempts 
to back up in his historical writings on the Church and Christendom. Modernity 
was in many ways an attempt by philosophy to replace Christianity in Europe as 
an incarnatory force with its sciences and morals and art, in sum its humanism. 
But he believed – and this is the seminal event overhanging all his thought – the 
devastation of the World Wars had disproved its claim, and that humanism had 
discovered, but not sufficiently digested, the truth of incarnation – that it is based 
upon service to somebody. The nations became the gods of the moderns, not 
them-selves, not nature and their sciences which were quickly placed in service to 
the nations and then their ideologies with their subsequent heads – Stalin and 
Hitler and the like.  
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4. A Christianity of Non-transcendence 
Given that Rosenstock-Huessy always insisted that he was a Christian thinker, 
that if known at all by people in the English speaking world it is as Rosenzweig’s 
‘Christian’ dialogical partner and friend who tried, but failed, to convert 
Rosenzweig to his faith, it is necessary to spend a little time spelling out exactly 
what he meant by Christianity. The need to do this is also underscored by the fact 
that  Rosenstock-Huessy was a thinker who wished to explicate what it means to 
be a Christian in a post-Christian age, i.e. in an age where most people not only 
no longer know what it means to be Christian, but don’t know that they don’t 
know, and yet, nevertheless are far more Christian than they realize.  
Rosenstock-Huessy’s Christianity,  has to be seen in light of his treating all past 
human formations, whether of the tribe, the empire, the polis, etc. as vital 
compounds formed by the vocabularies, with all the expectations and 
summonings of the people constituting them, which expressed the underlying 
realities which made them possible. Thus talk of Jesus’ divinity which everybody 
understood in Europe in the Middle Ages was connected with the world which 
surrounded them – classes, political powers, oaths, buildings, paintings, music etc. 
is no more nor less real than Zeus or Athena were for the world of the Greeks or 
Horace, Osiris and the ka were for the Egyptians. And with Rosenstock-Huessy, 
whether he was talking about the graves and the totems, or Horus and Osiris and 
the bestowing of the ka upon the Pharaoh, or Homer and the Greek pantheon, or 
the Jewish decision to abandon the ways of empire, he was primarily undertaking 
an archaeological act of linguistic and sociological excavation to show his readers 
what trials each people were responding to and how they had all found new forms 
of life which still resonate through our lives, if we are but attentive enough to 
notice. 
For Rosenstock-Huessy, what was unique about the Christian faith was that it was 
a way of world making dedicated to bringing all of human kind into one family 
based upon fundamental truths about suffering, love, death, creation, redemption 
and incarnation. For him, the Church was big enough to embrace those with 
‘otherworldly’ childish understandings and those who understood that Christianity 
was a commitment to making the world on the basis of sacrificial love.  Whether 
rightly or wrongly he was generally puzzled and astonished at what he thought 
were the inane and childish reductions that constituted the humanist and 
rationalist understanding not only of Christian life, but of all pre-humanist pagan 
life forms.14  Indeed, he generally acquainted this attitude with a non-historical 
                                                 
14 That Rosenstock-Huessy’s understanding of Christianity would find itself 
challenged is hardly surprising. Thus, for example, Karl Löwith in his 1946 
review of  The Christian Future for Church History: Studies in Christianity and 
Culture (1946, pp. 248-249) says that Rosenstock’s ideas are essentially closer to 
paganism (especially Goethe) and that he secularizes and vaporizes Christianity. 
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understanding of humanity – one which he saw as widespread even in the 
discipline of history – which so often simply transposed contemporary 
orientations (names) back into the past and thus missed so much of the experience 
of humanity because it insisted upon ascribing its own modern ‘denuded’ 
(humanist) view of ‘man’ to worlds which knew nothing of ‘man’ as such. 
One consequence, for him, of  the triumph of humanism and rationalism, he 
believed, was that most  moderns have simply forgotten what gods were. And he 
returns repeatedly to the term ‘god’ to bring out its sense as a power we serve 
which makes us speak, and guide our actions. In one particularly pithy 
formulation, which neatly captures the thrust of the new thinking’s insistence 
upon God and Man as two irreducible subjects of historical predications, he says 
that ‘God and Man  is a reciprocal letter exchange’ (1968, 23.) Restated in 
thoroughly secular terms and from our side – the forces we surrender to in our 
lives make us what we are; we become what we serve; what we sacrifice our-
selves to makes us.  
The failure to understand what a god is, for Rosenstock-Huessy, is on a par with 
our widespread failure to see beyond our own horizon and understand the truths  
behind the animism of tribal peoples or the insights into the moving heavens by 
early imperials peoples. Thus it was, he believed,  that today so many, including 
so-called Christians, failed to fathom the claims about Jesus’ divinity, which had 
to do with the overpowering of death, not in any mystical or Pythagorean manner 
of the continuity of the individual soul in a netherworld, but in the triumph over 
death and deadly forces through forming a body across time, the church. For 
Rosenstock-Huessy, Jesus was proof that Caesar and Pharaoh and ‘great men’ 
were not gods and Jesus’ divinization meant that after him  no one else would be 
God, that our redemption was universal and mutual. Jesus’ taking on the role of 
the crucified was to show us that we crucify God when we do evil to each other, 
and that we fail to achieve the maximum of our powers (our own divinity) in our 
failure to obey the law of love, and that to obey the commandment of love means 
being continually prepared to leave abodes ruled by death and die into new forms 
of love and fellowship.  
For Rosenstock-Huessy, the basic terms of Christianity emerged out of pagan and 
Jewish historical experience, and this fusion was a source of great historical truth 
                                                                                                                                     
For his part, Rosenstock-Huessy sees the kind of criticism being made by Löwith 
as due to a complete inability to understand the connection between the Christian, 
the pagan and the Jew and the widespread tendency, repeated by Löwith, to 
project Greek philosophical abstractions – soul, immortality, timelessness, the 
good etc. – onto Christianity. Rosenstock-Huessy, who was very critical in private 
correspondence to Georg Müller of Löwith, simply could not understand how 
Löwith could not see the connection between the murdering machines of 
modernity and modern philosophy. 
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about how reality is formed out of suffering and love. Hence a huge part of 
Rosenstock-Huessy’s corpus is devoted to showing the reality and power – the 
truth - of tribal and pre-modern imperial life (particularly Egypt) as well as the 
Greek city states and the Jewish people.15  
 
Rosenstock-Huessy also argued that  Christianity emerged as  a response to many 
of the same forces which created these other forms of life, only at a different 
historical time, a time where their degeneracy and deficiency had forced a new 
stratagem of social survival. The uniqueness of this new stratagem, for him, is that 
due to its peculiar fusion of suffering, sacrificial love, death, and universal 
redemption it was able to reinvigorate and reconstitute forms once spent, thus 
enabling the possibility of tribal peoples to harmonize with empires, and poets 
and philosophers to join with  prophets  in an attempt to realize the New 
Jerusalem. (Rosenstock-Huessy refers to this song of  Blake’s a number of times).  
 
This was what he meant by Christianity’s founding the full count of the times due 
to its  resuscitating ‘bodies’ from other times (see especially 1938 and 1987). Like 
Rosenzweig who also interpreted this combination of universalisation and 
redemption as the unending task of Christianity, Rosenstock-Huessy interpreted 
Christianity through the same broad triadic rhythm  as Schelling –Petrine, Pauline 
and Johannine, where there is the movement from the Church visible established 
by Rome, the church invisible of the Reformation to the Church fully devolved, 
yet alive, in modern society. 
 
 In Rosenstock-Huessy’s account the first millennium of the Church had created a 
widespread consciousness of love of the neighbour, having taken a faith of the 
Jews into  the pagan world, and by the ninth century it had created what he calls 
‘the world’s first universal democracy,’ All Soul’s Day, where the soul of the 
poorest peasant or widow was as much loved by God as the pope or emperor and 
all lived in the knowledge of the judgment to come. By contrast, the second 
millennium had been a connected series of ‘total revolutions.’ These revolutions 
involved the fierce actuality of last judgments, as people who lived with the 
promise of the second coming in their hearts had reached such a state of hatred, 
desperation and lack, a hatred of love’s and heaven’s absence in the society 
surrounding them, they had fought to bring heaven into the world. Each 
revolution while total in aspiration had only been partial in success, but the 
conditions of modern social and political freedom were, he attempts to show in 
                                                 
15 It is interesting to compare this strategy with Franz Rosenzweig whose The Star 
of Redemption has so often been criticized for its decision to show precisely 
where Judaism differs from every other way of world making (including 
Christianity which he saw as a ‘divine’ ally who would always also be an enemy). 
In effect, though, Rosenstock-Huessy conceived of his ‘Cross of Reality’ being 
the necessary complement of Rosenzweig’s ‘Star’ and that his task, as a Christian, 
was to discover what was redeemable and hence capable of being shared 
universally in every life-way. 
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his two main works on revolution, the byproducts of local revolts with total 
ambitions circulating in a world that was being fused by a common history and 
destiny. The World Wars were, he argued, the continuation of this revolutionary 
process. In sum, when Christ had said he had come to bring a sword, even though 
he was not urging the deployment of worldly means, the teaching of love that he 
had sort to place in the hearts of men and women had lead to a series of 
convulsions and cataclysms that were forcing us to obey the law of love or perish. 
These revolutions which stretched from the Investiture Conflict or what he calls 
the Papal revolution to the First World War and the Russian Revolution  had 
given the modern world its shape – and, he believed, its solution, the fulfillment 
of the messianic promise to Abraham and the real rationale for the church’s very 
existence, which had become the real future building mission of the (originally 
European now planetary bodies) politics of the last millennium.  
 
That solution was what he called a metanomical society, a planetary society in 
which discordances could be peacefully accommodated in creative tension. In 
fact, while Rosenstock-Huessy remains completely passed over by what can  
loosely be called post-modernism (although he had used the term as early as 1949, 
in his paper ‘Liturgical Thinking,’ as  a way of describing contemporary life) , he 
shares two major concerns with postmodernists: (a) the recognition that the global 
economy has reactivated the local and that any genuinely desirable revolutionary 
outcome must be receptive to local customs which enrich people, and (b) that we 
will only be able to create a life worth living at a planetary level if differences are 
not dissolved but able to retain their vitality.  
 
According to Rosenstock Huessy the lesson of history and the accumulated 
memory (history) of human suffering gathered through our speech-formed, time-
building capacity was that we all must live as Jew, Christian and Pagan. In his 
Christian Future and the second volume of the Sociology  he would elaborate on 
this by arguing that in our times we needed to fuse Christ, Abraham, Buddha and 
Lao Tse. His decision to make Buddhism and Taoism essential components of the 
contemporary cross of reality was part of his attempt to help found a metanomical 
framework which would enable the concordance of disparities. But it is fair to say 
that neither Buddhism nor Taoism, nor Islam (which he writes a section on in 
volume two of the Sociology), nor Hinduism occupied his attention anywhere near 
as much as the spirits of the tribes, Egypt, Greece, the Israelites and Christian 
peoples.  
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